CEO Fraud Red Flags: How to Spot a Fake Payment Request

Five transfers went out before anyone hesitated. CEO fraud rarely needs hacking. It needs authority, urgency and a believable instruction at the right moment.


 

Between 30 September and 7 October 2026, an accountant at a company in the Tyrolean district of Imst received a series of emails from her manager. Each one asked for a transfer abroad. She carried out five of them. Only the sixth request, for a payment to an account in Turkey, made her stop. By then, the company had lost a low six-figure sum. Her manager had never written any of those emails.

The case is unremarkable, and that is exactly the point. CEO fraud rarely relies on sophisticated hacking. It relies on a believable instruction reaching the right person at the right moment. Knowing the CEO fraud red flags is therefore less about spotting bad spelling. It is about recognising when a payment request quietly works against the way a company normally operates.

What is CEO fraud and how does it work?

CEO fraud, also called fake president fraud, is a form of social engineering. Criminals impersonate a senior executive, or sometimes a trusted supplier, to persuade an employee with payment authority to move money. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center classifies it as business email compromise (BEC). According to its latest annual report, BEC caused reported losses of just over US$3 billion across 24,768 complaints in 2025. Those figures cover only the United States, and only the cases someone reported.

Europe has its own reference case. Around the turn of 2015/16, an employee at FACC received emails that appeared to come from chief executive Walter Stephan. FACC is an Austrian aerospace supplier whose customers include Airbus and Boeing. The emails described a confidential acquisition abroad and asked for transfers. Roughly €50 million left the company for accounts in Asia and Slovakia. FACC managed to freeze €10.9 million, and the rest became a one-off charge of €41.9 million. Within months, the supervisory board had removed both the CFO and the CEO.

The mechanics have barely changed since then. The fraud borrows three things that organisations are trained to respect: authority, urgency and confidentiality. Fraudsters study organisational charts, travel schedules and press releases. They then build a story in which skipping the usual checks feels like loyalty. This mechanism is closely related to the cognitive biases that distort risk assessment.

CEO fraud red flags: how to spot a fake payment request

No single signal proves fraud. Like other early warning indicators in corporate security, the warning signs become meaningful when several appear together. They also matter when a request asks someone to step outside an established process. In practice, investigators look for these patterns:

  • Secrecy as a condition. The sender asks you not to discuss the payment with colleagues. The reason given is often a confidential acquisition, a regulatory matter or a sensitive negotiation.
  • Manufactured urgency. The deadline is today, and the request often arrives when the real executive is travelling, on leave or hard to reach.
  • A process that suddenly does not apply. Four-eyes approval, purchase orders or the usual signatories are bypassed “just this once”.
  • An unfamiliar beneficiary. This can be a new account, a bank in a country with no link to the business case, or an account holder whose name does not match the supposed counterparty.
  • Changed bank details. A known supplier announces new payment details by email. This variant is known as payment diversion or invoice fraud, and it needs no fake CEO at all.
  • Payments in sequence. The fraudster asks for several smaller transfers instead of one, or sends follow-up requests once the first payment succeeds.
  • Subtle channel changes. Watch for a slightly altered domain, a private address, a reply-to that differs from the sender, or a move to messaging apps “for discretion”.

One pattern deserves particular attention: the harmless first question. Many campaigns open with something innocuous, such as a request for the current account balance or a check that the recipient is available. This tests whether the target responds. It also establishes a conversation before the real request arrives.

Deepfake CEO fraud: can a video call be faked?

Yes – and it has already happened. For years, the standard advice was simple: if an email looks odd, call or meet the person. Generative AI has weakened that safeguard. In early 2024, a finance employee in the Hong Kong office of Arup joined a video conference with what appeared to be the company’s CFO and several colleagues. Arup is the British engineering group behind the Sydney Opera House. Every other participant on the call was a deepfake. The employee had first suspected a phishing email, but the call removed that doubt. He made 15 transfers totalling HK$200 million, about US$25.6 million, to five bank accounts before he checked with headquarters. Months later, Arup confirmed it had been targeted.

The lesson is not that video calls are worthless. Verification has to run through a channel the attacker does not control. That can be a number from the internal directory, a callback to a known contact, or a second approver who was not part of the conversation. The FBI recorded more than US$30 million in 2025 BEC losses with an identified AI component, and it notes that AI involvement is probably underreported.

What to do after CEO fraud – and can the money be recovered?

Sometimes, but only if you act fast. Banks can recall or freeze funds that have not yet moved on, which is how FACC recovered part of its loss. Austria’s Bundeskriminalamt advises companies to contact their bank immediately, preserve the emails as evidence and file a criminal complaint.

From that point on, an internal incident becomes an investigation. The receiving accounts are rarely the end of the trail. Funds often pass through money mule accounts, shell companies or crypto exchanges across several jurisdictions within days. Once crypto is involved, what the blockchain can reveal becomes as relevant as bank data. Following the money means connecting banking records, corporate registries and beneficial ownership data and open-source intelligence. It also means noticing when the same accounts or intermediaries appear in other cases.

Seen from that angle, CEO fraud is not really an email problem. It is an intelligence problem. It begins before the attack, when criminals map an organisation from public information. It continues after the attack, when someone has to reconstruct where the money went. That is where FOREUS works. We combine OSINT, financial investigation and asset tracing to turn a single fraudulent transfer into a clear picture of who received it, how it moved and what can still be recovered.

The accountant in Imst stopped at the sixth request because something finally did not fit. For any organisation, the better question is how to make that moment arrive with the first. And when it does not, the work that matters most begins: following the money before the trail goes cold. That is the work FOREUS was built for.